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- The single buyer and the customers risk that the independent producers might take advantage of their market power on the small-scale DHS (compared to the electricity system).
- On the other side, there is an investment risk for the producers to build new plants since there might be another new plant that may produce cheaper in the future.
- The overall system might suffer from suboptimization, which means every agent will try to optimize its subsystem, which can work against the overall optimum.
A framework was developed to solve these issues and weaken the arguments against competition in DHS.
The solution: A new framework
The framework is built upon the experiences from current planning and operation processes identified by literature review and interviews with Danish DH companies (figure 4).
Figure 4. Main elements of the new framework
The single buyer enters long-term contracts with independent producers in the capacity market. By this, the single buyer secures the heat supply and reduces the investment risk for new producers.
Participation in the capacity market is optional for the producers. Participation in short-term markets is obligatory for all producers. Producers that only participate in the short-term markets must pay a connection fee.
Continuously evaluating and adjusting the heat sources
Independent from the organizational form (introducing competition or not), heating plant capacities, the network, and substations must be planned, built, and changed. In the process of transition, legal and economic conditions are continuously evolving. It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate regularly if the DHS still meets the requirements and supplies heat under the best economic conditions. This evaluation of the financial situation is done by the capacity market in five phases (figure 5).
Fig 5. Capacity market process
The objective of the capacity market is to minimize total costs by balancing investments into the network and customers or the heat supply. The network operator should secure a minimum capacity to reduce some producers’ market power and their investment risk in new plants. Further, annual environmental targets and the scheduling of seasonal storage should be considered.
When long-term contracts are entered, flexible pricing mechanisms must be used. This includes two price elements—one for capacity (thermal power) and one for thermal energy. Both must consider price revision clauses to allow long-term adjustments of costs. Once a contract is entered, the single buyer will pay the thermal power price for the whole duration of the contract. The energy price element is based on the contract concept for differences to allow for short-term price adjustments. This energy price will only be paid if the plant is selected at the short-term markets.
Cost-optimal operation of the plants
If the ownership of the system is split into multiple companies, suboptimization must be avoided in the operative planning. Therefore, the cost-by-cause principle is introduced to the short-term markets:
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- Besides the costs for production, the prices for transportation (electricity demand of the pumps) should also be considered.
- By giving the supply temperature a price, the DHSs may be operated with locally different temperatures. This enables the operator to optimize the supply temperature considering the demanded temperature of the customers, heat losses, thermal stress, costs for temperature production, and network capacities.
To include these effects in the short-term markets, the principle of smart markets should be applied, as depicted in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Smart market dispatch model
Finally, these market routines are combined with a complete control and monitoring platform to control the relevant actuators for the system’s temperature, pressure, and flow rates. In case of deviation, this system control must be able to differ from the market results to keep the system stable and efficient.
Conclusion
The research shows that existing DHSs have a lock-in to high temperatures. Operators have only a low incentive to reduce these temperatures if existing (combustion-based) heating plants are still beneficial. The literature research identified that no comprehensive methodology is available to solve this issue from a systemic perspective. Therefore, concepts were developed to contribute to research and practice.
The presented eight DH scopes provide an orientation for all stakeholders involved in the transition or implementation of DHSs. The framework for design, operative planning, and operation depicts a target system for the transition in existing DHSs and can work as a blueprint for new DHSs. These contributions align the relevant activities in a transition-facilitating and economically efficient way. Different stakeholders, such as policymakers, municipalities, and DH companies, can apply them.
Since the development was limited in time and scope, further innovations are needed. For example, the advantage of introducing competition to accelerate the transition requires further evaluation on a macroeconomic level. It should consider the effects of the economy of scale and scope if competition were introduced on a national or even supernational (EU-wide) level. Further, the proposed concepts require further implementation. For example, the smart market dispatch model must be implemented and tested. Such an exemplary implementation is done in our current research project “Integrierter Wärmemarkt (Iwm)” [https://www.iw3-hamburg.de/iwm-waermemarktplatz/]. Finally, the entire framework requires a practical implementation.
This article is based on the research presented in the Ph.D. thesis’ A Comprehensive Framework and Associated Methodology for the Design, Operative Planning, and Operation of District Heating Systems to Facilitate the Transition Towards a Fully Renewable Heat Supply’. Figures are reused from the thesis and the defense presentation. For further information, see [https://www.doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/185882].
For further information please contact: Dr. Peter Lorenzen, peter.lorenzen@haw-hamburg.de